With the advent of electronic payment instruments, the need to use cheques to make payments has reduced significantly, as more efficient and secure alternatives became available. Nonetheless, in some countries, cheques usage is still relatively high. This paper analyses the effect on cheque payments, in the period comprised between 2000 and 2012, of two measures adopted in a number of EU countries: (i) the application of fees; and (ii) the establishment of an autonomous type of crime for unfunded cheques. It also draws orientations that can assist policymakers in the adoption of solutions that aim to promote a reduction in the use of cheques, taking into consideration the effect of socio-demographic, economic, technological and institutional factors. The empirical analysis is performed on both the number of per capita payments with cheques and the share of payments made with cheques (in volume). The results suggest that the imposition of fees had a negative effect in the use of cheques possibly due to the raise in the cost of usage, while the establishment of an autonomous type of crime had a positive impact, probably since it contributed to increase security in the use of this payment instrument. Countries that intend to further reduce cheques usage could therefore focus on those elements, as they can change the perception of the cost and security of cheques. In addition, policymakers should take into consideration that socio-demographic characteristics, as well as the business environment, the technological network and the institutional context can affect the results of adopted measures.
Introduction
Payment habits in European Union (EU) countries have been changing quite noticeably in the past years. Payments with cheques, in particular, have decreased, while electronic payment instruments (such as cards, credit transfers and direct debits) relevance has increased. Despite the declining tendency in cheques usage, in a number of EU countries their use is still quite substantial.
Considering this and bearing also in mind that making payments with cheques involves considerable social costs and risks, several countries intend to reduce their use and promote the adoption of electronic payment instruments. In order to define policies that effectively support a decline in the use of cheques, it is important to understand the impact that relevant factors have on cheques usage.
The existing literature shed light on some of the elements that might influence the use of this payment instrument. However, none of the studies focused, from an empirical point of view, on the analysis of the effect on cheque payments of legal factors, such as the existence of a fee associated with the use of cheques and the fact that unfunded cheques are considered as an autonomous crime.
In addition, in most cases, the investigation is only focused on the analysis of consumers' use of payment instruments at national level, not exploring the richness of panel data information. In fact, the few studies that analysed the differences in the use of payment instruments across countries (see, for example, Humphrey et al. (1996) and Guariglia and Loke (2004) ) only provide a partial picture of the range of socio-demographic, economic, technological and institutional factors that can also affect the use of cheques.
Therefore, this study aims to contribute to the existing literature through the investigation of the impact of the abovementioned legal factors, as well as of a set of socio-demographic, economic, technological and institutional determinants on the number of per capita payments with cheques at EU level, as well as on a new variable -the share of the number of payments with cheques.
In fact, the studies that investigate cross-country differences in the use of payment instruments only consider as dependent variable the per capita number of payment transactions, namely with cheques (and, in one case, also the per capita value). Yet, those variables are estimated using the total population and this implies including persons that do not use payment instruments (e.g., children) as well as persons that might not use all payment instruments (i.e., non-bancarised population). In our view, as an alternative approach, we should also consider as a variable of interest the share or proportion of payments made with cheques (in volume), as it is an indicator of relative importance, easing cross-country comparisons of the intensity of cheques usage. This dependent variable has also the potential advantage of minimising the effects of variations in consumption (for example, due to situations of financial crisis, since it might affect in a similar way the use of other payment instruments).
Our analysis uses data of the period between 2000 and 2012 for 27 EU countries and various estimation techniques (i.e., fixed effects, random effects, Hausman-Taylor, Poisson and fractional regression model estimators). The proposed estimation techniques take into consideration the characteristics of the data under investigation and, therefore, can be more adequate than the techniques adopted by other authors. In particular, the Poisson random effects estimator with lognormal distribution takes into consideration the fact that the number of per capita payments with cheques is a count variable. The fractional regression estimator accommodates the particular features of the share of payments made with cheques and deals with boundary outcomes.
By incorporating in the cross-country analysis legal factors collected for the first time for this study, considering a new dependent variable (the share of the number of payments made with cheques) and using updated estimation techniques, this study provides a pioneering investigation of the use of cheques in EU countries and presents new inputs to the definition and implementation of strategies that aim to reduce their usage.
The empirical analysis provided evidence of the negative effect associated with the imposition of fees in the use of cheques and suggested a positive impact connected with the establishment of an autonomous type of crime for unfunded cheques. It also highlighted the statistically significant relation that exists between socio-demographic, economic, technological and institutional factors and both the per capita number and the share of payments made with cheques. These results reinforce the fact that variables not considered by other authors play an important role in explaining the pattern of payments and the differences that still exist at EU level and, therefore, provide useful input for policy decisions.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the use of cheques as a payment instrument, highlights a number of measures already adopted to reduce payments with cheques and provides a summary of related literature. Section 3 describes the data used in the study and the methodology. Section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 discusses the main outcomes and provides some policy orientations. Finally, Section 6 draws the conclusions.
Framework

Brief overview of cheques as a payment instrument
According to Kokkola (2010) , a payment instrument is a tool or a set of procedures that allow the transfer of funds. Non-cash payment instruments, in particular, include those instruments that are not banknotes and coins. The most usual non-cash payment instruments in EU countries comprise cheques, payment cards, credit transfers and direct debits.
1
Cheques are one of the oldest non-cash payment instruments. Their use in Europe began around the year 1400, and even though fraud situations occurred quite frequently, cheques were considered as a convenient mean of making payments (Quinn and Roberds, 2008) .
The past years have seen remarkable changes in payment habits. Between 2000 and 2012 the number of per capita payments with cheques in the EU decreased 64%, from around 24 to about 9 payments per capita ( Table 1 ). The decreasing tendency in the use of cheques is also noticeable in the United States of America and in Canada, although in these countries the per capita number of payments made with cheques remained higher. Focusing on the evolution of the per capita number of payments with cheques in EU countries between 2000 and 2012, we conclude that the decreasing trend in the use of cheques is visible in all countries. Nonetheless, the use of cheques stayed fairly different between them.
From the analysis of Figure 1 we observe that, in 2012, more than 8 cheques per capita were used, on average, in France, Cyprus, Malta, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Portugal. The highest usage occurred in France, with around 43 cheques per capita in 2012.
1 For a detailed definition of each one of these non-cash payment instruments see Kokkola (2010) . A clearer picture can be obtained if we add to the previous analysis information regarding the percentage share of payments made with cheques. In the EU, the proportion of payments made with cheques (computed considering the relative importance of the total number of payments with cheques on the total number of payments made with cheques, credit transfers, direct debits and cards 2 ) has decreased from 18.4% to 4.6% between 2000 and 2012 (Table 2) . Regarding the relative importance of cheques in EU countries in 2012, we conclude that in Malta, Cyprus, France and Ireland the share of payments with cheques remained above 10%
( Figure 2 ).
2 The analysis is focused on non-cash payment instruments. 
Outline of some of the measures adopted to reduce the use of cheques
In order to reduce the use of cheques, different approaches have been followed by national and supranational authorities. At cross-border level, in 2002, the guaranty of €200 provided with 
Literature review
The decreasing trend in the use of cheques has been reported in several studies. The vast majority of the studies in this field have generally focused on the analysis of consumers' use of payment instruments at national level, using data either collected trough surveys and/or payment diaries to households or provided, for example, by grocery stores.
Although this literature is mainly focused on the increasing use of electronic payment instruments, some studies still explore the use of cheques, but address mainly the impact of socio-demographic aspects, consumers' perceptions of payment attributes, characteristics of the transactions and financial incentives.
Boeschoten (1998), Stavins (2001) , Klee (2006) , Borzekowski and Kiser (2008) and Koulayev et al. (2012) are among the many authors that reported the effect of consumers' age, income and education in the use of payment instruments using data collected through surveys. More recent studies, for example of Koulayev et al. (2012) , found evidence of a positive impact of age and a negative effect of income and education in the use of cheques. Schuh and Stavins (2010) and Schuh and Stavins (2013) complemented those analyses by incorporating in the explanatory factors consumers' perceptions of payment attributes (e.g., cost, speed, security, control, convenience and ease). Schuh and Stavins (2010) concluded that the use of cheques was negatively influenced by the perception of the cost and the inconvenience of cheques in comparison with alternative payment instruments. Schuh and Stavins (2013) also observed that consumers perceived cheques as being slow in terms of processing and less secure when compared with other payment instruments.
The effect of transactions' characteristics in the choice of payment instruments was reported by Hayashi and Klee (2003) , who found evidence of a negative impact of cashier absence and availability of self-service on consumers' probability of using cheques. Using data on payments made at grocery stores, Klee (2008) observed that the likelihood of using cheques reduced on Sundays and with smaller payments. Humphrey et al. (2001) and Bolt et al. (2008) are among the few authors who were able to include information of the price of payment instruments in the analysis at country level (regarding Norway and the Netherlands). The authors concluded that the pricing of cheques could be an effective instrument in promoting the use of electronic payment instruments.
Even though these studies provided empirical evidence of some of the reasons that explain the evolution in consumers' use of cheques, in particular in the United States of America (US), they have not presented detailed cross-country analyses. In fact, only few researchers studied the differences in the use of payment instruments between countries. Humphrey et al. (1996) , although more focused on the shift to electronic payments, (Humphrey, 2010) as well as owing to a nineteenth century banking legislation that discouraged the use of other payment instruments in the US (Quinn and Roberds, 2008 ). (2004) extended Humphrey et al. (1996) analysis by estimating static equations with the within estimator and dynamic equations with the difference Generalized
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Method of Moments (GMM), using data on the per capita volume and value of payment transactions from fifteen countries for the period between 1990 and 1998. The authors obtained empirical evidence of a positive influence of past habits and a substitution effect between cards and cheques in the volume and value of transactions with cheques.
Deungoue (2008) and Martikainen et al. (2013) , while focusing their analysis on the convergence of payment behaviour in European countries (for the periods from 1990 to 2002 and 1995 to 2001, respectively), put forward some possible reasons for the differences in payments with cheques. In both cases, the results suggested that payments with cheques were not converging in the EU. Deungoue (2008) argued that this could be due to card competition and to the existence of different rules in the various EU countries (although this was not empirically tested).
The abovementioned studies shed light on some of the factors that explain the use of cheques.
Nonetheless, legal factors associated with this payment instrument were not considered by the aforesaid authors in the cross-country analyses. As a result, the questions "what is the effect in the use of cheques in EU countries of the application of fees and the establishment of an autonomous type of crime for unfunded cheques, as well as what policy orientations can be derived from the empirical evidence?" remain to be answered.
Therefore, we intend to contribute to the existing literature through the investigation, at the EU level, of the impact of the abovementioned legal factors, taking also into consideration the effect of socio-demographic, economic, technological and institutional factors, both in terms of the per capita number of payments with cheques and the share of the number of payments made with cheques. Schmiedel et al. (2012) concluded that the weighted average unit social cost of cheques, from a sample of EU countries, amounts to €3.55 per transaction, which compares to €0.99 for cards.
The high average unit social cost of cheques results from the decrease in their usage. As the use of cheques involves considerable social costs for EU countries that still rely on this payment instrument, the proposed analysis is of particular relevance to policymakers, as it can unveil elements that could be taken into consideration when defining a policy that intends to reduce cheques usage.
Data and methodology
In this section we present a brief descriptive analysis of the data samples used, as well as the methodology adopted in the econometric examination.
Data and descriptive statistics
For the analysis we employed data from the European Central Bank Statistical Data
Warehouse regarding the per capita number of payments made with cheques in the EU countries and the share of the number of payments made with cheques 4 in the period between 2000 and 2012.
The data comprises all payment transactions initiated with cheques. According to the methodological notes of this database, it is considered as a cheque any written order from one party (the drawer) to another (the drawee, which is usually a credit institution) requiring the drawee to pay a specified amount to the drawer or to a third party named by the drawer. Cheques are only counted on the payee's side when submitted for cheque clearing.
The following As expected, we observe that, in both variables, the between variation is considerably higher than the within variation. This reflects a greater difference between countries than in each country across time, possibly as a result of progressive changes in the pattern of payments in the period under analysis, as reported in Figure 1 .
In terms of independent variables, and considering that this study intends to offer an examination of the impact in the use of cheques of legal factors not considered in any of the models in the existing literature in this field (according to our knowledge), two legal variables were included in the analysis: (i) the application of fees; and (ii) the establishment of an autonomous type of crime for unfunded cheques.
In order to collect information on the existence of fees associated with the use of cheques we consulted the EU National Central Banks 5 and included in the model a time-invariant dummy variable (fees). 6 In addition, to verify if legal rules can impact the use of cheques, we also confirmed with National Central Banks if unfunded cheques were considered as an autonomous crime and included another time-invariant dummy variable (crime).
Since this study also aims to draw policy orientations from the empirical analysis, it also includes socio-demographic factors typically only considered in the analysis of survey data (e.g., in
Boeschoten (1998), Stavins (2001) and Klee (2006) ), as well as economic, technological and institutional factors, usually incorporated in the existing literature on the analysis of cross-country differences in payment habits (e.g., in Humphrey et al. (1996) and Guariglia and Loke (2004) ).
In fact, investigations based on national payments data found that the education level of consumers has a negative impact in the use of cheques, while age has a positive effect. Hence, in order to capture the effect of those characteristics at an aggregate level we included: (i) the share of population with upper secondary or tertiary education attainment (edu); and (ii) the median age of the population (age).
Nevertheless, cheques are not only used by consumers but also by businesses (including the public sector). To include these elements we also added economic variables that reflect the business environment. In particular, we included the change in the real Gross Domestic Product (gdp), and the private consumption as a percentage of GDP (pcons).
Following the existing literature, we incorporated as technological factors the number of ATMs (atm) and POS terminals (pos) per thousand inhabitants. In fact, ATMs facilitate cash withdraws and can also promote the use of cards for certain transactions. POS terminals, on the other hand, support payments with cards. These factors can assist the substitution of cheques at the point of sale.
In addition to the abovementioned factors, institutional characteristics can also play a role in determining the use of payment instruments, namely cheques. So, in our analysis we included two dummy variables that reflect the fact that countries belong (or not) to the euro area (euroarea) and the impact of the beginning of the recent financial crisis and of the SEPA project 7 , in particular, the launch of the SEPA credit transfers scheme (2008) . We also incorporated a variable denoting the number of offices or places of business that provide payment services (i.e., that execute payment transactions on behalf of a natural or legal person) per thousand inhabitants (offices), as they can facilitate the handling of cheques by consumers and businesses. In order to account for possible substitutability effects, we included the number of per capita payments with cards (cards) and the number of cash withdrawals (cash) as a simple proxy for cash usage. Credit transfers and direct debits are generally used for payments of a different nature (e.g., rents) and, therefore, were not considered as direct substitutes of cheques at the point of sale. 7 The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) is a project that aims to harmonise retail payments in euro by enabling individuals, firms and public administrations to make and receive cashless payments throughout the Member States of the EU and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway, Switzerland and San Marino using just one bank account located in any of these countries and a single set of payment instruments (credit transfers, direct debits and cards). For more information see, for example, Virtanen (2014) .
An interaction term between the variables 2008 and fees was also included in order to identify if the impact of the establishment of fees changed after the beginning of the recent financial crisis and of the SEPA project.
Detailed information on the independent variables used in the empirical analysis can be found in Table 6 of the Appendix. In order to choose the most appropriate estimator we began by considering the fixed effects (or within) estimator and the random effects estimator (Wooldridge, 2002) . In the former, the Nevertheless, the Hausman test was performed to validate which estimator was the most suitable. Under the null hypothesis the individual effects are random and, therefore, both estimators are consistent, but the fixed effects estimator is inefficient. Under the alternative hypothesis only the fixed effects estimator is consistent. We performed a robust version of the test. In addition, a RESET test was applied to the random effects model to confirm the adequacy of the specification. The null hypothesis is that the model is correctly specified.
To test the robustness of the results we also validated the possibility that some of the explanatory variables (i.e., the technological variables atm and pos, as well as the institutional variables cash and cards) were correlated with the individual-level random effects, by using an alternative estimator based on instrumental variables proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981) that includes elements from the fixed and random effects models.
In this estimator, the time-variant variables are used not only to estimate their own coefficients but also as instruments in order to estimate the coefficients of time-invariant variables. The regressors that are uncorrelated with the fixed effects must be distinguished from the ones potentially correlated with the fixed effect. In addition, time-varying and time-invariant regressors should also be identified. To assess overidentifying restrictions in the model, we performed the Sargan-Hansen test (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009 ). The null hypothesis of this test postulates that the instruments used in the model are valid.
In these models we assume a linear condition mean:
being the dependent variable, X the explanatory variables and the coefficients.
Although linear models are typically the most straightforward approach, they can have some shortcomings when using the type of data under investigation. In fact, the number of per capita payments made with cheques is a count variable with nonnegative integer values. According to Wooldridge (2002) , linear models might not be the best solution, since they can generate negative predicted values.
Therefore, a Poisson regression with robust standard errors was also tested. Considering that the number of per capita payments made with cheques reveals some over-dispersion, an alternative option could be the negative binomial model. Nonetheless, Gourieroux et al. (1984) have shown that the Poisson estimator with robust standard errors is consistent, even under misspecification of the distribution, as long as the mean is correctly specified, while the negative binomial estimator is inconsistent if the true distribution is not negative binomial.
Three alternatives were considered: a fixed effects Poisson model, a random effects Poisson model where the random effects follow a gamma distribution, and a random effects Poisson model where the random effects follow a lognormal distribution. To validate the adequacy of the random effects models, RESET tests were performed. In addition, Average Partial Effects (APE)
were computed for the legal factors in order to measure the effect of changes in the covariates on the response variable, averaged across the population.
To verify which model was more adequate we tested the random effects against the Poisson random effects with lognormal distribution using a J test for non-nested regression models (Baum, 2006) . In this test we compared the explanatory power of both models.
Joint significance tests were performed in all the categories of independent variables considered in the random effects and Poisson random effects model with a lognormal distribution.
Analysis of the share of payments with cheques
In the examination of the effect of the previously mentioned legal, socio-demographic, economic, technological and institutional factors on the proportion of payments made with cheques in EU countries, the following model was estimated:
where is now the share of payments made with cheques (in volume) and all the other variables are the same of model (1).
Considering that the variable regarding the share of payments made with cheques is bounded between zero and one, linear models might not be adequate according to Papke and Wooldridge (1996) , Ramalho et al. (2011) and Ramalho and Ramalho (2015) .
A more appropriate econometric approach, highlighted by Ramalho et al. (2011) and Papke and Wooldridge (1996) , is the assumption of a functional form that requires the needed constraints on the conditional mean of the dependent variable. In this investigation three conditional mean functions (logit, complementary loglog and probit) were assumed in the fractional regression model (FRM):
All the models were estimated by pooled quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) with a robust version of the variance of the estimated parameters. To verify if the models used in the analysis of the share of payments made with cheques were adequate, a RESET test of the specification of the fractional model was performed. Additionally, the APE of the legal factors were computed. Table 5 presents the results of the various estimated models.
Empirical results
Analysis of the number of per capita payments made with cheques
We began the analysis of the model of the number of per capita payments made with cheques with the fixed and random effects estimators. By computing the Hausman test (in the robust version) a p-value of 0.9921 was obtained, so the random effects approach was not rejected. To validate the adequacy of the random effects model we performed a RESET test and obtained a p-value of 0.4532. We concluded that the specification was correct. As explained in chapter 3.2.1, the Hausman-Taylor estimator was also applied. To test overidentifying restrictions the Sargan-Hansen test was performed and a p-value of 0.5130 was obtained, so the instruments used in the model were valid.
The results obtained with the random effects and the Hausman-Taylor estimators are very similar. In both models the existence of fees has a statistically significant negative impact in the number of per capita payments made with cheques in the period under analysis. Joint significance tests were performed in all the factors considered in the analysis.
Socio-demographic factors were not statistically significant in the random effects model.
Institutional and technological elements were not statistically significant in the Poisson random effects model with lognormal distribution. Nevertheless, all of the mentioned factors were kept in the analysis because they were significant at least in one of the models.
Analysis of the share of payments made with cheques
For the analysis of the share of the number of payments made with cheques we used a FRM estimated with pooled QML. The adequacy of the model was tested through the RESET test.
Since the model with a probit conditional mean function had a p-value of 0.3660, we focused our analysis on its results. Table 5 highlights that both legal variables included in the model are statistically significant.
The imposition of fees is associated with a reduction in the share of payments with cheques and the existence of a specific legal regime that penalises writing unfunded cheques is related with a higher share of cheque payments. The APE reveal that the size of the impact of the legal factors is -0.14 (fees) and 0.04 (crime).
The results also underline the relevance of socio-demographic factors for the pattern of cheques' usage, as both variables considered in the model are statistically significant. In particular, higher levels of education are negatively related with the share of payments made with cheques.
The variable connected with the age of the population reflects that, the higher the median age of the population, the smaller the proportion of payments made with cheques.
Economic factors are also statistically significant. An increase in private consumption is associated with an increase in the share of payments with cheques. In what concerns to technological elements, we conclude that POS terminals have a statistically significant positive effect in the proportion of payments with cheques.
Regarding institutional factors, the share of payments with cheques appears to be positively related with belonging to the euro area. On the contrary, the beginning of the implementation of the SEPA project and of the recent financial crisis, as well as the use of cards has a statistically significant negative effect.
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Discussion
The impact on the use of cheques in EU countries of the existence of fees revealed to be of relevance. The results also highlighted a potential effect of the establishment, in the law, of an autonomous type of crime for unfunded cheques.
The analysis of the results obtained with the random effects, Hausman-Taylor, Poisson random effects with a lognormal distribution and FRM with a probit conditional mean function estimators showed that the implementation of fees had a negative effect on the number and share of payments made with cheques. As data on the prices of the various payment instruments was not available for all countries, Humphrey et al. (1996) included in their model a proxy, but concluded that their impact was very modest. In our case, we obtained evidence that the fact that fees are applied to cheques can reduce their use. The relevance of this element was very clear in Sweden, where the decision to charge a fee per cheque in the beginning of the 1990s led to a sharp reduction in their adoption without any political convulsion, according to Nyberg (2008) .
Our findings also suggest that the existence of an autonomous type of crime for unfunded cheques might impact positively the number and share of payments made with cheques. The fact that this result was only obtained with the Poisson random effects with a lognormal distribution and FRM with a probit conditional mean function estimators might reflect a less relevant result than the one of the variable fees. However, this legal provision can provide greater protection and, for that reason, make cheques usage more attractive (in particular with bigger amounts).
Taking the above into consideration, policymakers that intend to reduce the use of cheques can intercede by supporting the establishment of fees by the banking community. It might also be useful to discourage the implementation of protection laws on cheques.
Nevertheless, the payments' pattern is also intrinsically related with its users' characteristics.
In general terms, cheques can be used by consumers and businesses (including from the public sector). In our model, we tried to capture the relevance of consumers' characteristics in the use of cheques through socio-demographic factors. We also attempted to reflect the business environment using economic variables.
Socio-demographic factors revealed to have a statistical significant impact on the per capita number of cheques used and on the share of the number of payments made with cheques.
In the model of the share of payments made with cheques we concluded that the use of cheques was negatively affected by the education level of the population. This result is in line with the conclusions of Borzekowski and Kiser (2008) and Koulayev et al. (2012) using survey data in the use of payment instruments in the US. The observed impact can result from the fact that populations with average higher education levels replace more easily the use of cheques with electronic payment instruments.
The effect of age was also highlighted in the results obtained with the Poisson random effects with a lognormal distribution and FRM with a probit conditional mean function estimators. Ceteris paribus, it is expectable that an older population will use more cheques. However, this should only occur until a certain age, because after that point, older people will probably not buy as frequently the goods and services usually paid by cheques (e.g., car or house).
Bearing in mind the above, socio-demographic characteristics of the population should be duly considered by policymakers. As the adoption of electronic payment instruments will probably be quicker in countries where the population has higher education levels and is younger, policies and measures adopted should be appropriately differentiated and/or targeted to older population with lower education levels.
Considering economic variables as an indicator of businesses activities, we can conclude that, in general, they impact the use of cheques. This can be associated with the fact that companies, compared to consumers, have more information on payment instruments and are more cost aware and efficiency seeking and can, therefore, choose more easily other instruments that are considered as more convenient and cheap. It is worth noting that this connection was not identified in previous studies that use data on the number of payments with cheques, namely those of Humphrey et al. (1996) and Guariglia and Loke (2004) . Bearing this in mind, the implementation of policies that bring more clarity on the costs and benefits (namely to merchants and governments) of the use of different payment instruments can be a good approach to reduce the use of cheques.
Notwithstanding the above, policymakers could prepare more effective strategies if, in a previous moment, a survey is made regarding the use of cheques. This survey should detail not only information on the users, but also on the type of transactions where cheques are sill the preferred payment instrument (for example, cheques might be the preferred payment instrument in large value transactions due to the time delay that occurs between its delivery and the clearing process). This could help to identify alternative payment instruments that are more adequate to each type of transaction.
The technological environment should also be considered by policymakers. In fact, we observe that the number of ATMs, contrary to the results obtained by Guariglia and Loke (2004) , impacted negatively the use of cheques. This can be linked with the fact that ATMs ease cash withdrawals, as well as the use of cards for certain transactions. Usually, when ATMs are introduced in a country they are mainly used to withdraw cash. Later on, the population generally starts to use ATMs to do more operations with cards (e.g., ATMs are used to pay services that would usually be paid with cheques).
POS revealed a positive effect in the share of payments made with cheques. This can be related with the fact that the number of POS terminals that already exist in several EU countries is not contributing to a greater substitution of cheque payments by cards. It can also result from the fact that the number of transactions considered in our analysis (namely in the computation of the share of payments with cheques) refers to both retail and large value transactions, while POS terminals are used, in most cases, in low-value transactions. The substitution effect that is expectable in low-value transactions with cheques can therefore not be visible if the number of large-value transactions is significant.
Considering the above, policymakers should bear in mind that the technological infrastructure can accelerate the replacement of cheques by other payment instruments or cash, although this effect can vary according to the implementation stage of the ATM and POS terminals network in each country. An additional approach can be to increase the services that are provided with the existing technology in order to make their use more valuable for consumers and businesses.
Institutional factors can also play a role in the pattern of cheques usage. As offices are used by consumers and businesses to deliver cheques for processing, a higher number of offices make it more convenient. Implementing or increasing prices associated with this service can reduce its use. Restructuring the banking sector and decreasing the number of offices can have this effect indirectly.
As already reported by previous studies, cards seem to play a role in substituting cheques, according to the results obtained in the model of the share of payments with cheques. Focusing the attention on enhancing the use of cards (in particular of debit cards) can therefore be a good approach in discouraging the use of cheques. However, this should be done taking also into consideration the characteristics of the population and businesses operating in the country, as well as the features associated with the various instruments (e.g., regarding speed, security and cost) in order to ensure the efficacy of the measures. Contrary to the expected, the use of cash did not revealed a statistically significant connection with use of cheques.
The variable 2008 had a statistically significant negative impact in both the model of the per capita number and the share of payments made with cheques. When we considered the interaction with the variable fees we concluded that, after the year 2008, the impact of the imposition of fees was inferior to the one before this year (in both the random effects and Hausman-Taylor estimators). In the Poisson random effects estimator with a lognormal distribution the negative effect was bigger after the year 2008. We expect that the impact of the SEPA project increases when the focus is placed on the cards industry (i.e., after august 2014).
Authorities should also bear in mind that, even though social costs associated with the use of payment instruments provide the basis for policy intervention, the level of involvement should be carefully considered. If the existing framework of each country is not regarded, the adoption of the discussed measures can bring unintended distortions to the payments market (e.g., by increasing the use of cash, which has high costs to society).
In addition, and although this was not fully explored in our empirical analysis, policymakers should also take into consideration the fact that payments are connected with each country culture and way of conduct, as underlined by Virtanen (2014) .
The potential negative impact of the measures adopted on specific groups (e.g., elderly population) could be addressed with information on existing alternatives to cheques by improving financial literacy education. This should provide increased awareness and confidence on electronic payment instruments and, therefore, expand their usage.
Concluding remarks
EU countries are in the process of shifting from paper-based payment instruments, such as cheques, to electronic payment instruments. In fact, the use of cheques has higher social costs and fewer benefits to economic growth when compared, for example, with debit cards. Considering this, authorities in countries where cheques are still frequently used are trying to implement measures to discourage its usage.
The main aim of this paper was to investigate, from an empirical point of view, the effect in the use of cheques in EU countries of: (i) the application of fees; and (ii) the establishment of an autonomous type of crime for unfunded cheques. In addition, it also intended to draw attention to the impact that socio-demographic, economic, technological and institutional factors can have in the implementation of measures that intend to reduce the use of cheques.
Our main contribution with this study consisted in providing, for the first time, an analysis of the effect in the use of cheques in EU countries of legal factors that were collected specifically for this study and in getting empirical evidence of other important elements that could also be considered in the promotion of a decline of cheques usage.
To achieve this goal we employed updated estimation techniques and used a new dependent variable (share of the number of payments made with cheques) that, due to its nature, can be a more reliable measure of comparison between countries and, as a result, can complement the analysis of the number of per capita payments with cheques.
From the empirical examination we concluded that legal elements associated with the existence of fees and the application of an autonomous crime regime to unfunded cheques can affect the use of cheques.
In addition, our findings suggest that the socio-demographic characteristics of consumers can have an important role in improving the results of measures adopted by authorities or in slowing them. Furthermore, businesses can be open to changes that allow a reduction in the costs supported.
The technological infrastructure of ATMs revealed an important support role in the promotion of the use of cards. It is expectable that this substitution process can, in addition, be reinforced in the future by institutional factors, namely trough projects at EU level, such as the SEPA project.
From the investigation we can derive several policy orientations. First, authorities could promote the implementation of legal rules that reduce the attractiveness of cheques (either by increasing their cost or by deterring legal protections), as these factors revealed to have an impact in cheques usage. In addition, authorities should take into consideration the fact that socio-demographic characteristics of consumers and the business environment can have an effect on the result of the measures implemented, as older and less educated consumers and businesses with reduced dynamism can be slower to change to electronic payment instruments. The technological infrastructure and the institutional environment, on the other hand, can provide the basis for a smoother shift to cards, for example.
Nevertheless, the framework of each country regarding the abovementioned factors can influence the degree of authorities' intervention in this field, as alternative approaches (namely, based on a catalyst role that leads other players to intercede) can be more adequate.
In addition, attention should be made to the fact that policy orientations provided by this study were derived using data for the period between 2000 and 2012. As some of the countries started adopting measures to reduce the use of cheques earlier, part of the effects might not be fully reflected in our conclusions.
We also recall that the road to more efficient payment instruments is not done exclusively by reducing the use of cheques. Efforts should also be applied in providing secure and efficient electronic payment instruments. For that reason, future investigation could focus on the analysis of the factors that affect the use of electronic payment instruments. 
